[ Case study ]
The group ran two separate stores for two brands: two catalogs to update, two checkouts to reconcile, two sets of promotions — and shared suppliers meant inventory went negative on one brand whenever the other sold.
CLIENT a housewares group with two consumer brands — FOCUS Consolidate the catalog, keep the channels
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Housewares sold under two labels the group bought at different times: one aimed at design-conscious apartment dwellers, the other at family kitchens, sharing several suppliers and, quietly, much of the same stock. The group ran each brand as a separate store — separate catalogs, checkouts, promotion calendars — with a two-person ecommerce team maintaining both. When one brand's buyer took the last of a popular item, the other's storefront kept selling it into negative inventory. The duplication wasn't the brands' fault; it was the architecture's.
The group ran two separate stores for two brands: two catalogs to update, two checkouts to reconcile, two sets of promotions — and shared suppliers meant inventory went negative on one brand whenever the other sold.
We proposed consolidating onto one BigCommerce catalog with Multi-Storefront channels: one stock pool, two storefront faces. Each brand keeps its own domain, theme, and presentation; the underlying product records, inventory, and fulfilment become single-sourced. Promotions and content split per channel, tested against a matrix so a brand-A coupon can never leak to brand B. Shared-stock decrement would be proven with concurrent orders across both storefronts before either channel went live — the negative-inventory incident was the wound, and the architecture had to prove it closed.
Just as important is what we ruled out, and why:
One catalog with channel-level presentation on Multi-Storefront, so both brands sell the same stock pool with their own faces.
Promotions and content move per channel, tested against a matrix so a brand-A coupon can never leak to brand B.
Shared-stock decrement was tested with concurrent orders across both storefronts before either went live.
Delivered by the systems pod — engineer + commerce lead over 9 weeks, with working increments reviewed with the client every week.
Obstacle
The first week exposed a decrement race our synthetic test was too polite to catch: simultaneous orders across both channels on the last unit occasionally double-sold.
Handled: We reproduced it at production volumes, enabled the platform's stronger reservation behavior on shared items, and re-tested the exact concurrency case that failed before reopening both channels.
Obstacle
Both brands' category URLs had earned years of search equity; the consolidation plan's tidy catalog would have orphaned one brand's addresses entirely.
Handled: Per-channel URL rules preserved each brand's existing paths, with a redirect map covering the handful of records whose canonical product changed under the merged catalog.
The headline: catalogs to maintain, with inventory accuracy restored across both brands — 2 → 1, read from Inventory reconciliation report. A second check: negative-stock incidents from cross-brand selling since launch at 0.
The ecommerce team stopped living in duplicate: one catalog change lands on both brands in their own clothes, and Monday reconciliation became a five-minute glance. Negative-stock apologies ended, which removed the most embarrassing email in their week. Each label runs its seasonal promotions without checking whether the other brand is leaking, and the suppliers' stock picture is finally one picture. The owners' original fear — that consolidation would blur the brands — dissolved once each storefront launched looking exactly like itself.
The result was read from Inventory reconciliation report against the pre-engagement baseline over the stated window, with a guardrail check on negative-stock incidents from cross-brand selling since launch. Where platform-reported numbers and business outcomes differ, this record says which layer it is quoting.
What we would do differently
We would have tested the concurrent-order inventory case with production data volumes — our synthetic test was too polite to catch the race the first week exposed.
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